value. I will suggest that our best hope of a post-capitalist future beyond the disastrous risks of the Anthropocene is to take a very critical look precisely at this human artifact that we call money. Given the widespread consensus and voluminous deliberations on the sociopolitical and ecological ills of an abstract system referred to as "capitalism," my main point is that money is the elephant in the room.
Capitalism as the Logic of Money
To most of us, even to Marxists, money is like water is to fish-and yet the intrinsic logic of this human invention is nothing less than capitalism itself. As we can see in Grundrisse ([1858] 1993), Marx himself seems to have been profoundly aware of this,  which raises the question of why neither he nor most of his followers made the very artifact of money the primary target for reform.
1 Although Marx and a small minority of Marxists envisaged post-capitalist society as necessarily moneyless, such visions have universally been dismissed by practical politicians as utopian (Nelson 2001a; Buick 2011) . In contrast to 'utopian socialists' like Robert Owen, political regimes inspired by Marxist theory have generally not contemplated radically transforming the role of money. 2 Yet money in its present form-that is, what anthropologists refer to as "generalpurpose" money-inexorably generates not only increasing global inequalities but also the appalling degradation of the biosphere with which we are all so concerned. The basic conundrum of money is that it is simultaneously an idea, or sign (a unit of account), and a potent material force. Money is represented as a reflection of some underlying and more material level of reality to which it refers, yet in itself it organizes that material reality. This duality explains Marx's contradictory approach to money, as evident in his critique of utopian socialists like the Owenites, whose ambition to abolish money he dismissed as "useless and idealistic" (Nelson 2001b, 46) . Rather than seeing money as the source and essence of capitalist property relations, Marx argued that money could only be dethroned by first transforming the social relations of production.
 As with so many other aspects of Marx's creatively "undisciplined" thinking, his understanding of money has become the focus of exegesis and voluminous academic deliberation (e.g. Sieber [1871 Sieber [ ] 2001 de Brunhoff [1973] 2015; Nelson 1999 Nelson , 2001b Moseley 2005) .
1 As we shall see, precisely the same question can be raised regarding Marxian approaches to technologies.
2 Serious visions of a moneyless economy were nevertheless integral to Bolshevik discussions in Russia in the years following the revolution in 1917, as well as to debates in Cuba in 1963 -1965 (Nelson 2001a . A prominent proponent of the abolition of money was Che Guevara, whose decision to leave Cuba was prompted by his defeat in the debate over this issue.
Instead of losing ourselves in libraries of abstract theoretical arguments on all the possible complexities of the logic of "capitalism"-whether viewed from a bourgeois or Marxian perspective 3 -we need to take a detached, second look at the seemingly self-evident, cultural idea of money, namely the idea that everything is interchangeable on the same market. This idea-this artifact-makes it possible to purchase human time as well as entire ecosystems as market commodities. This prompts everyone to accumulate as many abstract claims on other people and resources as they can, which implies wanting to pay as little money as they can for what they buy.
Even if it may sound like an outrageous simplification, this is the common denominator behind slavery and climate change. As long as we don't question the idea of money itself, both slavery and environmental degradation will be understood as consequences of "underpayment"-whether underpayment of labor or underpayment of "ecosystem services"-but the notion of underpayment only makes sense as long as we remain confined within the conceptual universe of general-purpose money which assumes that everything has a correct price. It implicitly accepts the ideological illusion that in principle all things can be exchanged at rates that can be objectively established as equal and fair. The illusion of abstract equivalence among incomparable qualitiesthe very foundation of capitalist social organization-is as misleading in terms of its implications for social justice as it is in terms of ecological sustainability (Nelson 2001a ). This illusion is encapsulated in the universally employed but insidious concept of 'value.'
The logic of capitalism has been intricately elaborated by both bourgeois and Marxist economists, all similarly eager to discover the covert regularities and trajectories of societies organized in terms of money. The complex implications that can be derived from the rather simple idea of money have preoccupied vast numbers of theorists and mathematicians united by the assumption that this social invention is as immutable as natural law. The potential repercussions of various economic policies and regulations have been traced and debated by countless people committed to the conviction that there is no alternative to general-purpose money. As traditional world-system cores in the 1970s faced economic decline and fiscal deficits, the so-called neoliberal program emerged as a reflection of the imperatives for efficient capital accumulation inherent in the logic of money. Regardless of how repulsive we find the prescriptions of neoliberal economists, they appear to have spelled out the polarizing logic inscribed in the idea of money itself. In this convoluted sense we may have to concede that the policies advocated by Thatcher and Reagan-and no less the trajectories of post-Maoist China and post-Soviet Russia-reflect some fundamental requirements on the management of money.
Given the conceptual constraints of general-purpose money and their specific definition of market "efficiency," perhaps mainstream economists cannot be blamed for endorsing economic policies that increase the abysmal global inequalities and threaten to make the planet uninhabitable for human beings. The absurdity of allowing a specific human artifact to drive our species to extinction must clearly remain beyond the pale for people whose daily activities and sense of meaning hinge on remaining within the conceptual constraints provided by this artifact.
Like the ancient Easter Islanders chipping away at their stone statues, we are prevented by our cultural priorities from actually dealing with the fact that we are destroying our ecological context.
The Money Artifact as the Root of All Evil
Although to some theorists it may sound impermissibly reductionist, most of the ills of the system that we refer to as "capitalism" can be derived from a simple logic inherent in the artifact (or meme) of money itself. It is the idea of money that makes it possible to purchase and own labor and land, and the commodification of labor and land are of course fundamental to capitalism (Polanyi 1944 To focus on the exploitative and destructive logic of the idea of money might finally help us envisage the end of capitalism. 4 To choose to scrutinize the implications of a particular human artifact rather than immerse ourselves in theoretical deliberations on the structural ramifications of a specific "mode of production," may be viewed as a concession to the radical empiricism of Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005) . The great differences in outlook between Marxism and Actor-Network Theory help explain why the attribution to money itself of all the evils of capitalism was not compatible with Marx's project. 5 Conversely, the ideological differences between them may explain why, remarkably, leading Actor-Network theorists such as Bruno Latour have chosen not to scrutinize the most quintessential human artifact of all. I am not suggesting that we think of money as having agency, which would be to fetishize it, but that we acknowledge the extent to which it encourages specific inclinations in the collective manifestations of human agency.
If acknowledging the significance of specific artifacts is tantamount to a concession to Actor-Network Theory, it is the only concession that a Marxist political ecology would need to grant to Actor-Network Theory. As I have argued in a recent article (Hornborg 2016b) , artifacts may have fundamentally transformative social consequences, but never agency. A truly critical social theory will need to retain a realist ontology and robust analytical distinctions between the symbolic phenomena deriving from human society on the one hand, and the non-symbolic aspects deriving from pre-human substrates of the universe on the other. So-called posthumanist attempts to dismantle all distinctions between the social and the natural, humans and nonhumans, and even subjects and objects, will not help us. To dissolve such distinctions is not to challenge power hierarchies-on the contrary, it is to abandon our capacity to do so. Maintaining such analytical distinctions-frequently rejected as "Cartesian"-has very little to do with the mind-body dualism articulated in the seventeenth century by René Descartes. Fortunately, most eco-Marxists stay away from the so-called post-Cartesian deliberations of the posthumanists. 6 A coherent political-ecological understanding of the Anthropocene can only be built on the analytical distinction between the societal logic of capitalism (i.e., money) on the one hand, and the pre-symbolic and non-human aspects of the biosphere revealed by sciences such as thermodynamics, geochemistry, and ecology on the other. Only by recognizing this distinction can we identify the potential for human choice and the extent of political responsibility.
To attribute a pervasive social causality to a specific human artifact does not mean subscribing to Actor-Network Theory or more generally to a posthumanist outlook. The recent 5 As Nelson (2001b, 60-61) observes, "Marx is mainly engaged in criticizing, correcting and perfecting abstract theories, despite his claims to being a materialist, which one might expect to imply a more empirical bent."
6 An unfortunate exception is Jason W. Moore (2015) .
6 discovery that human society is transforming planetary carbon cycles should least of all lead to a dismantling of social science (Hornborg 2015) . The notion of the Anthropocene risks making a social process look like the inevitable product of human biology. It is obvious that no other species could have invented capitalism, but as Andreas Malm and I argued in a frequently cited article (Malm and Hornborg 2014) , we have to keep in mind that the so-called Anthropocene is the creation of a minority of the human species in its struggle to dominate and exploit the global majority. It was to make this point that Malm coined the currently influential concept of the Capitalocene.
The Spirit of Marx
Before continuing, I want to propose that we should watch out for dogmatism, that is, the kind of knee-jerk reaction to unfamiliar and undigested thoughts which relegates them to the opposite camp (as if there were always only two options: one with and one against; one authentic and one heretical; one radical and one bourgeois, and so on). Like other movements and faiths, Marxism has suffered from processes of internal contradiction, exclusion, and fragmentation. There are thus obvious analogies between the historical development of Marxism and that of Christianity.
Although Marxism and Christianity are often viewed as opposed to each other, the analogy between them is not far-fetched. Both aspire to provide a holistic worldview embodying not only analysis but also moral and political imperatives and visions of the future. Both are fundamentally committed to justice and to the compulsion to challenge illegitimate power and inequalities. Both are based on the revelations and subversive proposals of venerated founding figures. And both may actually belong to the same millennial tradition of ideas challenging the deification of money. It is a paradox that both political ecology and the cultural ecology to which it was opposed frequently refer to Marx. The founding figures of cultural ecology, such as Julian Steward and Leslie White, were heavily influenced by Marxist materialism. Although rarely viewed from a global perspective, energy flows were a central concern of cultural ecology. This concern with energy was Marxist in the crude sense of aspiring to explain cultural superstructures as reflections of material infrastructures, but for cultural ecology this approach had become a functionalist concern with 'adaptation' to the natural environment. Political ecology, on the other hand, while sharing the focus on the environment and natural resources, looks for explanations of human-environmental relations not in the local ecosystem, but in the global economic system which ultimately conditions local life. The energy flows that concern political ecology are not so 8 We could add that a similar tension between a conflict-and a consensus-based approach to human ecology has recently been revived in the opposition between political ecology and resilience theory (Hornborg 2009; Watts 2015) . This means that after forty years since its inception political ecology still needs to expose functionalist assumptions in mainstream discourse on human-environmental relations. inanimate as an organism that has starved to death. These are facts of physics, but they cannot be translated into economics. Energy is expended (dissipated) in any production process, but the amount of energy expended cannot be translated into exchange value. In other words, exchange
value cannot be analytically derived from the amount of energy expended. is all the more disconcerting to realize that this critique has been couched in the categories (most centrally 'value') of the very system it claims to challenge.
Machine Fetishism and Unequal Exchange
Marx's keen insights on the social repercussions of money did not prompt him to advocate a transformation of the money artifact itself, perhaps because the notion that specific artifacts can generate particular forms of social organization was not a prevalent component of European worldviews in the nineteenth century, or maybe because the prospects of transforming money seemed less realistic than a socialist revolution. In most modern Marxist thought it seems to be held that money-which, inspired by Shakespeare, Marx called the "universal whore" (Marx he must have visualized capitalist machines as intrinsically non-social products of engineering, that is, as "productive forces" detachable from their social context. This is a paradox, because it means that the theorist who taught us to understand how artifacts in capitalist society tend to be fetishized (to represent social relations as if they were relations between things) was himself suffering from the illusion which I have called "machine fetishism" (Hornborg 1992; . 
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When we refer to the existence of a particular kind of technology, we tend to equate it with a corpus of know-how, a state of engineering, a set of ideas about how something can be achieved. My point is that this cognitive aspect of technology is no doubt a necessary condition for its existence, but it is not a sufficient condition. A prerequisite to modern technology as a physical phenomenon is an unequal or asymmetric societal exchange of resources such as embodied labor, energy, land, or materials. I am not referring here to technology conceived of water, oxygen, and so on, the existence of a technological system is contingent on specific flows of energy and materials, and at specific rates. These latter flows are organized by the economy.
Technologies are thus contingent on the rates at which energy, materials, and other inputs and outputs are exchanged in human societies. In accordance with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, we know that the output of any technological system will represent less available energy or productive potential than the input required for its production. To be viable, in other words, a technological system must be reproduced through ecologically asymmetric is not so much a matter of ingenious and innocent breakthroughs in engineering as of devising 11 The symbiosis of money and technology is well illustrated by the capacity of contemporary financial magic to propel physical production processes based on unconventional (and very low-EROI) fossil fuels extracted from tar sands or through fracking. Another example is the claim that photovoltaic energy-although low-EROI and heavily subsidized by fossil fuels (Prieto and Hall 2013) -is becoming economically competitive with fossil fuels, an assertion that is largely founded on the reduction of labor costs derived from shifting production of solar panels to 
Conclusions
For more than two hundred years fossil fuels have not only been fundamental to our technologies, but have also conditioned our ways of thinking about economics, even in heterodox economics, without us realizing how much our conceptions of economic growth and 12 It is a paradox that historical materialists in this respect appear to conceive of technologies as ideas rather than as vortices in asymmetric societal flows of matter and energy.
14 technological progress have depended on the specific properties of fossil fuels. 13 The contemporary money-energy-technology complex frames the conceptual horizons even of its critics. To envisage the road to a post-capitalist society as a matter of shifting energy sources and collectively controlling the money while basically retaining the conventional idea of money and hoping to maintain our current technologies and consumption levels is delusory. A vision of post-capitalism that holds on to the idea of general-purpose money is a contradiction in terms.
The organizational inertia of general-purpose money runs counter to the ideals embodied in the notion of socialism. To suppress this inertia requires totalitarian regulation which runs counter to ideals of democracy and personal freedom. Rather than build society on a tension between the inertia of its artifacts and the political attempts to regulate it, it must be a better idea to design those artifacts so that their consequences are more closely aligned with political ideals.
If we seriously consider the predicament illuminated by Georgescu-Roegen, our only option for post-capitalism is degrowth (cf. Latouche 2012) . And degrowth requires that we fundamentally transform our idea of money. As financial bubbles have grown and burst, we have recently been reminded that money is a magical artifact that can dissolve into thin air. What this should also remind us is that it is ultimately up to us to design money in a way which will keep the biosphere inhabitable and increase global justice. The rules that we have bestowed on our artifacts can, in principle, be changed, just as the rules in chess or Monopoly can be changed. It is symptomatic of fetishism to believe that the logic of the artifacts and regulations which rule our lives is as inexorable as natural law.
It is understandable that a general critique of money will seem incomprehensible to people who cannot see that the design of money is something about which we actually have a choice, but this just illustrates how constrained our imagination tends to be by the artifacts that currently rule our lives. I cannot bring myself to believe that it would be feasible to completely abolish money and markets in human societies, as advocated by proponents of "non-market socialism" (Rubel and Crump 1987; Nelson and Timmerman 2011) , but I am convinced that money can be redesigned so that its inherent logic would be to increase diversity and sustainability, while reducing social inequalities and vulnerability (Hornborg Forthcoming trade" is imperialism and unequal exchange. But underlying it all-and this is where the Left needs to rethink some of its basic premises-it means recognizing that our preoccupation with money and crucially also with "technological progress" can be understood as fetishism, in the sense that relations between people assume the appearance of relations between things..
